The Quiet War: How 2026 Will Be Fought in Cyberspace, Cryptocurrencies, and Crowds

The next war won’t start with a missile streaking across a black sky. It’s already humming under your fingertips—an electrical storm inside routers and wallets and social feeds. There are no parades, no declarations, no borders to cross. There is only the constant pressure of influence, intrusion, and money in motion. The battlefield is invisible. The soldiers look like us. And the weapons are information, currency, and belief.

America is not sleepwalking into this conflict—we’re scrolling into it. The Quiet War has no single author and no single front. Nation-states stir it. Terror networks exploit it. Criminal gangs profit from it. Lone actors are recruited by it. The rules were never written for it. And 2026 will be the year we either learn to fight in this strange atmosphere or we inhale it until our institutions wheeze.

This essay lays out the operating picture of 2026 through three converging fronts—Cyber, Currency, and Crowds—then connects them to a realistic threat matrix for the United States: domestic violent extremism, transnational jihadist networks (especially ISIS-K), state-enabled proxies, and crime-terror hybrids in the Western Hemisphere. The goal is not to frighten; it is to focus. The Quiet War rewards the disciplined, the integrated, and the fast. Everyone else becomes content.

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I. The New Grammar of Conflict

For most of the twentieth century, Western strategy assumed that force is something you can see: formation, mobilization, projection, impact. In 2026 the grammar has been rewritten. Force still matters—but narrative, identity, and liquidity now shape the battlefield long before the first kinetic strike. Call it non-kinetic domain dominance: whoever commands the data flows, the cash flows, and the attention flows wins the shaping fight and narrows the other side’s options.

Three realities define this new grammar:

1. Speed beats scale. A fragment of code, a synthetic video, a coordinated “influencer” dogpile—each can move faster than policy can react. A day of trending fiction can shatter a year of careful deterrence.

2. Enablers outrun enforcers. Financial plumbing, shell companies, virtual asset service providers, mixing services, and gray-market remittance channels are adapting faster than compliance regimes. The money that animates extremist plots rarely touches a bank; it passes through a chain of plausible deniability.

3. The home front is the front. In 2026 the most immediate terrorism danger to Americans is inside the homeland. The same platforms that deliver groceries deliver propaganda, targeting cues, and operational guidance to people who never picture themselves as “combatants” until the moment they act.

A practical conclusion follows: the most dangerous adversaries are not always the ones with the biggest guns—they’re the ones with the best routers, the quietest donors, and the deepest reach into our heads.

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II. The Cyber Front: Intrusion as Atmosphere

There is no “peace” in cyberspace. There is only constant contact—probing, mapping, stealing, pre-positioning, and sometimes flipping the switch when the stakes or the message warrants it. What changes in 2026 is not the existence of this contact but its automation and autonomy.

State actors—Russia, China, Iran, North Korea—will continue to drive the highest-end intrusions against critical infrastructure, defense industrial targets, and media platforms. They will also continue to outsource deniable operations to quasi-patriotic hacker groups and cut-outs. But the rising noise floor comes from the commercialization of sophisticated capabilities: AI-assisted spear phishing, large-scale credential stuffing, automatic lateral-movement kits, and marketplaces where zero-days are sold like concert tickets.

Non-state actors are already adapting. Jihadist and extremist communities don’t need to invent new tools; they simply rent them and hide in the traffic. Expect three developments to define 2026:

• AI-augmented intrusion at scale. Models trained to profile an organization’s social graph and craft individualized phish at machine speed will make yesterday’s “good tradecraft” seem quaint. The goal is not to breach one target; it is to breach thousands, cheaply.

• Supply-chain subversion for narrative effect. Attacks that swap code libraries, poison updates, or tamper subtley with content pipelines will be designed as psychological operations as much as technical ones. Imagine your trusted software pushing a “security alert” that is actually a rumor.

• Ransomware with a political payload. Criminal crews will continue to monetize chaos. But watch for a sharper overlap: ransomware timed to civic events, or “leaks” engineered to feed extremist narratives. Profit and politics are not rivals—they are roommates.

Cyber risk will not distribute evenly. Hospitals, regional utilities, municipal systems, and small defense suppliers remain softest because they are essential but thinly resourced. The Quiet War goes where the doors are unlocked and the pain is high.

The old comfort—“they’ll hit the big cities first”—is obsolete. In cyberspace, every town is a capital.

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III. The Currency Front: Money in the Shadows

Follow the money and you find the plot, the logistics, the loyalty. You also find the weak points in a global economy built for speed and convenience, not hard attribution.

In 2026, the terrorist-financing picture is a web of old ingenuity and new rails:

• Traditional methods—hawala, bulk cash, trade-based money laundering—will persist. They’re durable because they fit local cultures of trust and because they hide in legitimate commerce.

• Virtual assets lower friction. Cryptocurrencies and tokenized stores of value do not create illicit finance; they simply accelerate it, reduce overhead, and offer an illusion of anonymity. “Mixers” and cross-chain bridges complicate tracing. “Stablecoins” reduce volatility risk for illicit treasuries.

• Front organizations, sham NGOs, and shell companies remain the great equalizers. They convert dirty flows into clean contracts and humanitarian cover, then back again. As one watchdog put it, the shell company is the getaway car of global finance.

What’s new in 2026 is the convergence of automation and opacity. Expect to see:

• AI-managed laundering that monitors on-chain heuristics and shifts routes dynamically as analysts close in.

• Exploiting humanitarian and conflict flows—using real crises and real charities as camouflage to move money to fighters who destabilize the same communities donors think they’re saving.

• Micro-financing of terror through thousands of small transactions designed to never trip a threshold or provoke a file. It’s not the one big wire anymore; it’s the drip-drip that fills the barrel.

Financial intelligence officials already warn that our regulations are chasing a shape-shifting adversary. In a world where a smartphone can become a bank, compliance is a moving target and the bad actors have more time to aim.

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IV. The Crowd Front: Weaponized Attention

The old propaganda playbook targeted ideology; the new one targets identity. It isn’t trying to persuade you with argument; it’s trying to trigger you with emotion. That makes everyone susceptible. It’s easy to picture the “other side” as the only target. The truth is colder: anyone who can be enraged can be enlisted.

The engineering of mass behavior in 2026 will lean on four accelerants:

1. Generative AI as an attention multiplier. Synthetic news anchors, voice-cloned officials, “citizen footage” that never happened—high-quality fakes tuned to your fears. The aim isn’t perfect realism; it’s plausible urgency.

2. Algorithmic herding. The crowd moves when it believes the crowd is moving. You don’t need millions of bots; you need a few thousand accounts to simulate momentum and your target’s network will do the rest.

3. Micro-targeted grievance. Adversaries don’t push a single narrative; they plant conflicting narratives calibrated to fracture social trust—law enforcement vs. communities, veterans vs. activists, “patriots” vs. “traitors.” The goal is not to win an argument. It’s to make civil argument impossible.

4. Street-to-screen feedback loops. Protests and counter-protests become laboratories for content. A single clash edits into a thousand different “truths,” each confirming a separate faction’s suspicions. Extremists fish in these waters for recruits. Terrorists look for cover.

If the meme is the new missile, then friction is the new air defense. Platforms and communities that slow virality, that reward context and penalize incitement, blunt the weapon. But friction and profit rarely coexist. That is the national dilemma we keep postponing.

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V. The Threat Picture for 2026

The three fronts converge into a threat matrix. Not every actor uses every tool; not every danger is equal. But the pathways are consistent.

1) Domestic Violent Extremism (DVE)

The most persistent and immediate risk to Americans remains homegrown—small cells and lone actors radicalized through grievance content, guided by accessible tradecraft, and financed at trivial cost. The ideology is not a single flag; it is a marketplace of rage: racially or ethnically motivated extremism, violent anti-government currents, accelerationist fantasies, and retaliatory violence around domestic flashpoints. The signature of 2026 is less the spectacular plot and more the sustained pressure of low-complexity attacks against soft targets.

Cyber and currency amplify this. A radicalized individual can acquire instruction, reconnaissance, and money without leaving a digital footprint that looks any different from normal life: a shopping list of dark-market items, a cascade of “tutorials,” a handful of anonymous donations, and a narrative that promises immortality in fifteen seconds of infamy.

Expect targeted violence against civic spaces, faith communities, government facilities, law enforcement, and symbolic cultural venues. The psychological objective is to convince Americans that we cannot live together, cannot debate without blood, cannot trust the person in the next line. If the Quiet War breaks the American imagination, kinetic attack becomes merely punctuation.

2) ISIS-K and the Post-Caliphate Network

The Islamic State lost its caliphate but not its method. Its brand survives as a franchise model across Africa and Central Asia, and its most dangerous offshoot for external plotting remains ISIS-K. It is both a local player in Afghan-Pakistani dynamics and a global impresario of inspiration: it curates grievances, circulates training, claims credit for mayhem it merely fertilized, and occasionally directs or facilitates something bigger.

The 2026 risk is twofold:

• Inspiration pipelines—online radicalization that translates into attacks with little command-and-control signature in the West.

• External-operations facilitation—small networks using conflict zones and permissive borders for travel, training, or staged propaganda designed to provoke overreaction.

The network’s financial strain is real; salaries have fallen, recruitment pools fluctuate, and counter-terrorist finance (CTF) scrutiny has improved. But austerity can make terrorism more dangerous, not less, because it drives reliance on cheapest methods: small arms, edged weapons, vehicle rammings, crude IEDs, simple cyber-enabled harassment. These are low-cost, high-terror per dollar.

3) Al-Qaida Affiliates and the Sahel’s Expanding Fire

The center of gravity for jihadist territorial ambition shifted toward Africa, especially the Sahel and East Africa, where security vacuums and governance stresses allow al-Qaida-aligned coalitions and Islamic State affiliates to recruit, tax, and terrorize. This matters to the United States even when it feels geographically distant. American diplomats, contractors, aid workers, and commercial interests operate in these zones. The guarding of ports and corridors that feed global supply chains depends on regional stability. And every ungoverned space invites external-ops incubation.

For 2026, the most realistic U.S. exposure is indirect: kidnap-for-ransom, attacks on partners, and maritime disruptions radiating from coastal penetration by Sahel insurgencies. But indirect does not mean unimportant. Small fires in fragile places can cast global smoke.

4) State-Enabled Proxies and Gray-Zone Tactics

Terrorist tactics are no longer the exclusive property of “terrorist organizations.” States sponsor, shelter, or look away when proxies act in their interest. They wage campaign-length cyber operations below the threshold of open war. They use quasi-legal information outfits to launder narratives into Western discourse. They strike dissidents abroad and call it policing. They mix criminal profit with political intimidation.

This is not the Cold War; it is colder. And it means that some of the most sophisticated adversaries the United States faces in 2026 will be hybrids: part intelligence service, part criminal enterprise, part ideological movement, each piece disposable if exposed. You cannot deter what can always claim it doesn’t exist. You can only raise the cost and shorten the runway.

5) Crime-Terror Hybrids in the Western Hemisphere

Cartels and gangs are not “terrorists” in the strict legal sense, but many have adopted terroristic methods—assassinations, bombings, mass intimidation—to control territory and political outcomes. In parts of Latin America this convergence has produced instability whose shockwaves reach U.S. communities through migration surges, supply chain risk, and diaspora-targeted violence.

The Quiet War cares little about our labels. When a criminal group uses terror tactics, the effect on local populations and regional governance is the same. And when those groups partner with ex-insurgents or foreign enablers for weapons, training, or laundering, the problem becomes strategic.

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VI. Likely Scenarios in 2026

Forecasts are not prophecies. But smart preparation begins with plausible arcs:

1. A lone-actor attack against a civic venue, inspired by domestic or transnational propaganda, executed with low-tech means, broadcast live. The damage is limited; the political aftershock is not.

2. A coordinated ransomware wave against hospitals or utilities in several states, timed to a polarizing national event. The attackers claim ideology; the wallets end in familiar criminal hands. Crime and cause become mutually reinforcing alibis.

3. A high-profile disruption traced to a compromised AI or data pipeline, where manipulated information drives a financial panic or a public safety failure. The post-mortem reveals a months-long operation that looked like routine traffic at every step.

4. A kidnapping or targeted killing of U.S. partners in West Africa, claimed by a jihadist faction, amplified by affiliates for recruitment, and financed through a chain of small donations that never trigger a threshold.

5. A gray-zone operation against diaspora activists on U.S. soil, blending surveillance, intimidation, and cyber harassment. The sponsor denies involvement; the victims lose faith in protection; the message to others is received.

None of these scenarios require an army. All of them require readiness—technical, legal, and cultural.

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VII. How We Win the Quiet War

There is no silver bullet, only a stack: tools, partnerships, habits. The stack must be faster than the threat and harder to break than the story the threat tells.

1) Harden the Domestic Cognitive Space

• Make community-based prevention boringly normal. It works best when it looks like school programs, public-health models, and faith-community partnerships—when it speaks the language of belonging, not bureaucracy. We will not de-radicalize by lecture. We will pre-radicalize by invitation.

• Modernize legal friction for virality. The First Amendment’s protection of speech is non-negotiable. But amplification is not speech; it is a product feature. Platforms that profit from algorithmic herding should carry a duty of due care when intelligence flags crisis conditions. The law does not have to define truth to dampen incitement.

• Train a citizenry that can recognize weaponized content. Media literacy is not a luxury subject. It is digital civil defense. Teach adolescents how to spot synthetic media the way we taught earlier generations how to spot fake checks.

2) Starve the Money

• Terrorist finance is a plumbing problem. Fix the pipes. Close the loopholes for shell companies, enforce beneficial-ownership transparency, demand real compliance from virtual asset service providers, and audit the humanitarian sector’s susceptibility to exploitation with respect and resolve.

• Treat mixers and cross-chain bridges like high-risk financial services. Not every privacy tool is a crime tool, but the ones that function like unregistered laundries should face the same scrutiny. If a bridge’s business model depends on opacity, the rest of us are paying the bill.

• Expand trade-based money-laundering analytics. Terror money is increasingly hidden in shipping paperwork and invoice games. The countermeasure is pattern-matching at scale across customs, banks, and logistics firms, with legal authorities that allow sharing fast.

3) Build Real Cyber Resilience

• Push security into the bottom of the market. National programs should subsidize basic hardening for hospitals, municipalities, and small suppliers—MFA, patch pipelines, offline backups, tabletop exercises. The cost of not doing this is paid in ambulances and brownouts.

• Assume breach, practice recovery. The fastest way to defang ransomware is to make it boring for the attacker: immutable backups, segmented networks, and rehearsed playbooks that bring the lights back in hours, not days.

• Treat information systems like safety systems. When AI and data feeds steer real-world decisions—dispatching, triage, utility loads—apply the rigor we use for aviation: testing, auditing, red-teaming, and mandatory reporting of serious near misses.

4) Think Like a Network, Not a Silo

• Fuse intelligence without drowning in it. The Quiet War produces oceans of “signals.” The answer isn’t to collect more; it’s to prioritize better and share faster with those who can act—state fusion centers, local partners, and the private sector.

• Tie foreign and domestic CT in one narrative. The same group that menaces a contractor in West Africa may inspire a teenager in Milwaukee. Our strategies should reflect reality: one network, many faces.

• Elevate financial intelligence to co-equal status with the kinetic kill chain. If you cut the money—quietly and relentlessly—you cut the muscle memory that makes plotting possible.

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VIII. What to Watch (2026 Indicators)

• A sharp rise in small-value, high-velocity on-chain movements around conflicts and protests—signals of micro-financing or covert redistribution.

• A mainstream platform caught amplifying a synthetic incident before verification—evidence that our cultural “immune system” is still too slow.

• Regional coups or collapses in the Sahel that open a corridor to coastal states—test cases for whether jihadist expansion can leverage maritime access.

• Evidence of state-enabled proxy activity in North America or Europe targeting dissidents or diaspora leaders—gray-zone tactics crossing legal red lines.

• A major hospital system reduced to pen-and-paper for days due to ransomware—signalling that we continue to under-invest in the bottom tier of critical infrastructure.

When any of these appear, the response must be whole-of-nation and on the clock. In the Quiet War, victory belongs to the side that acts before the narrative hardens.

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IX. The Stakes

A skeptic might say: This is melodramatic. America is strong; we’ve seen worse. They’re right about the strength. They’re wrong about the form of the test.

The Quiet War is not trying to defeat our military. It’s trying to exhaust our civic capacity, erode our trust in one another, and make us mistake inconvenience for oppression, rumor for proof, performance for policy. It’s trying to convince us we’re alone. We are not.

What we decide in 2026 is whether we will adapt. Whether we will fight for the spaces between us with the same seriousness we bring to the spaces beyond us. Whether we will invest in the boring things that make bright things possible: backups, audits, local partnerships, shared facts, honest disagreements, slow conclusions.

The missiles may never fly. The invasions may never march. Yet the war is here—inside the signal, inside the wallet, inside the crowd. The question is not whether we will fight. The question is whether, by the time we notice, the fight has already chosen us.

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References (no hyperlinks)

1. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Homeland Threat Assessment 2025. Washington, DC: DHS, September 30, 2024.

2. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community 2025. Washington, DC: ODNI, March 18, 2025.

3. Defense Intelligence Agency. Worldwide Threat Assessment: Statement for the Record to the House Armed Services Committee (2025). Washington, DC: DIA, 2025.

4. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. National Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin, June 22, 2025.

5. Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Comprehensive Update on Terrorist Financing Risks (2025). Paris: FATF, July 8, 2025.

6. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). Advisory FIN-2025-A001: ISIS-Related Illicit Financial Activity. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Treasury, April 1, 2025.

7. Europol. European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2024. The Hague: Europol, December 12, 2024.

8. Europol. Major Developments and Trends on Terrorism in Europe in 2024 (press summary). The Hague: Europol, June 24, 2025.

9. United Nations Security Council, Counter-Terrorism Committee/CTED. Briefing on the Secretary-General’s Strategic-Level Report on ISIL/Da’esh, February 7, 2025.

10. Associated Press. “Islamic State and al-Qaida Threat Is Intense in Africa, with Growing Risks in Syria, UN Experts Say.” AP News, August 2025.

11. Reuters. “Financial Crime Watchdog Calls for Countries to Come Clean on Shell Companies.” Reuters Business, September 3, 2025.

12. FATF. “The Financial Action Task Force: Mandate and Areas of Work.” Paris: FATF, 2025.

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Author’s Note on Method

This assessment synthesizes publicly available U.S. government threat reporting, European law-enforcement trend data, international counter-terror finance findings, and mainstream wire-service coverage of UN expert reporting and global regulatory updates through October 2025. It prioritizes patterns that are stable across multiple sources (e.g., domestic violent extremism as the leading homeland threat; terrorist-financing adaptability; ISIS-K’s external-ops posture; the Sahel’s expanding insurgent footprint) while recognizing that specific incident risk fluctuates with geopolitical shocks.

Defense Officials Praise Troops' Actions in Train Attack

WASHINGTON, August 22, 2015 — In a statement released today, Defense Secretary Ash Carter praised three Americans for their actions yesterday on a train outside of Brussels, Belgium.

"On behalf of all the men and women of the Department of Defense, I want to thank the brave individuals, including two members of the U.S. military, who stepped forward to prevent an even greater tragedy from taking place aboard that train," Carter said.

U.S. Air Force Airman 1st Class Spencer Stone, assigned to the 65th Air Base Group, Lajes Air Base, Azores, Oregon Army National Guard Spc. Alek Skarlatos and a civilian friend were traveling together via train on personal leave. The men took immediate action to subdue an armed gunman before he could engage his automatic weapon on the train.

"My thoughts and prayers today are with those injured in the attack, including Airman 1st Class Spencer Stone, whose selfless actions saved lives. I wish him a speedy recovery," the defense secretary said.

"These men are heroes," said U.S. European Command Commander Air Force Gen. Philip M. Breedlove.

"Actions like this clearly illustrate the courage and commitment our young men and women have all the time, whether they are on duty or on leave," he said. "We are extremely proud of their efforts and now are praying for our injured airman to have a speedy recovery."

Stone, who suffered non-life threatening injuries in the attack, is currently being treated in a French medical facility.

"(Stone and Skarlatos) are two reasons why -- on duty and off -- ours is finest fighting force the world has ever known," Carter said.

Multinational Seminar Examines Violent Extremism

By Jason Tudor

George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

GARMISCH-PARTENKIRCHEN, Germany – Professionals from 61 countries have gathered at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies here to share ideas about countering violent extremism across the globe.

A senior executive seminar titled “Beyond Al Qaeda: How to Understand and Counter Violent Extremism” gathers 98 ministers, parliamentarians, general officers and other senior leaders from around the world.

The forum provides a unique opportunity for senior policy makers to seek common understanding to a problem that doesn’t recognize borders, said Marine Corps Col. Philip Lark, the seminar’s deputy director.

“Participants are engaging in candid discussion of violent extremist ideology and activity,” he said. “The seminar is facilitating a comprehensive, cooperative approach to the problem.”

With 25 lecturers -- including Navy Adm. James G. Stavridis, NATO’s supreme allied commander for Europe -- scheduled over eight days, the agenda is a busy one. Lark said the idea was to gather as many diverse points of view as possible.

“This problem has deep roots and is without borders,” Lark said. “The solutions we attempt to gather must be comprehensive.”

In his opening remarks to the group, retired Army Lt. Gen. Keith W. Dayton, Marshall Center director, said the time this group has together is vital and should be a shared experience.

“You will get out of this course what you put into it,” Dayton said. “There will not be a ‘sage on the stage’ who will give you wisdom and you walk out feeling much better. This is your course, and it is interactive.”

About 80 NATO senior enlisted advisors will work alongside the seminar participants, including Navy Master Chief Petty Officer Roy M. Maddocks Jr., U.S. European Command’s command master chief; and Air Force Command Chief Master Sgt. Richard T. Small from NATO Allied Command Operations.

Also among the attendees are 10 general officers from the National Guard and Air National Guard via the State Partnership Program sponsored by Eucom.

The Marshall Center staff conducts two senior executive seminars each year. A seminar in January dealt with the “Arab Spring” and revolution across the Middle East. Like that previous seminar, Lark said, this seminar centers on real-world happenings. The event’s lectures and smaller-group studies bring them into sharp focus, he added.

“Everything within the seminar is designed to deepen our understanding of the linkages between extremism, radical violence, globalization, and religious and cultural differences,” Lark said. “Participant expertise and experience will add context to these discussions. Extremists of all determinations pose a dangerous threat to global security and must be examined with equal diligence –- fighting extremism must be done with both determination and insight.”

Lark said the goal is for participants to return home with a deeper awareness of key issues that influence national, regional and international security; the factors that shape security strategy; and the components of cooperative security in an interdependent world.

Empire Shield arms Wisconsin National Guard with homeland defense information

By 1st Sgt. Vaughn R. Larson

Wisconsin National Guard

With the CERFP's (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Explosive Emergency Response Force Package) recent certification, the Wisconsin National Guard has additional resources to apply to domestic emergency operations. To get a sense of how National Guard assets can integrate with local agencies, a team of Wisconsin National Guard members representing the Joint Staff and CERFP visited the New York National Guard's Joint Task Force Empire Shield, which has conducted a state-duty homeland security mission since Sept. 11, 2001.

"We were able to visit with the command elements of JTF Empire Shield and discuss with them in depth and see first-hand how they conduct their missions and orchestrate their day-to-day missions," said Brig. Gen. Scott Legwold, director of the Wisconsin National Guard Joint Staff. "Our takeaways are truly learning from an organization that provides personnel to support homeland security day in and day out at multiple locations in a vast metropolitan area, which is not done in any other cities [currently] to our knowledge."

JTF Empire Shield has approximately 280 National Guard Soldiers and Airmen on state duty in three company-sized elements, patrolling vital transportation terminals in the New York City area and nuclear power plants north on the Hudson River. They coordinate daily with various law enforcement agencies and state agencies such as the New York Naval Militia - a state maritime agency comprised largely of retired Navy Reserve personnel.

Lt. Col. Peter Riley, JTF Empire Shield commander, explained that his troops support law enforcement, but their primary mission is to detect and deter terrorism.

"Sometimes that means they can assist law enforcement, but they don't have the power to arrest," Riley said.

"We're there for presence," added Senior Master Sgt. Edwin Mondezie, Jr., the JTF Empire Shield senior enlisted advisor. "It's so difficult, the role that we play. Even explaining it to the Soldiers, it gets difficult. We're one incident away from being good guys to, 'Why are they out there?' So we have to make sure at all times that we are supporting law enforcement, not doing our own thing."

"Our customers, agency partners and the public in general like what we do," Riley said. "They like that show of force, that presence."

Mondezie said it is impossible to measure how many threats have been prevented simply by having armed Guard members on patrol.

Maj. David Hellekson, the Wisconsin National Guard provost marshal, was impressed with JTF Empire Shield's scale of operations.

"The interagency cooperation has to exist at so many different levels," Hellekson said. "That really drives home the importance of building relationships between those agencies so you can function and train, so when real stuff happens you're ready to go. You have those relationships established and methodologies established so you can act when you're needed to respond."

Capt. Jeremy Duffy, a member of the Wisconsin National Guard CERFP, agreed.

"The biggest thing was how they did the integration and joint service connection, the interagency cooperation between the police, fire and different law enforcement agencies," Duffy said. "As we stand up [the CERFP], that's going to be our biggest challenge - to figure out how we bridge the gap and create that cooperation for interagency training and application."

Duffy said one lesson learned from JTF Empire Shield is to request to train with agencies the CERFP will support in the event of a domestic emergency. 

"That way they're really driving the train and we're not," Duffy said. "They're running the show and we're just there to supplement them."

Legwold said the information gained can be applied if the Wisconsin National Guard is ordered to augment local authorities.

"We certainly can turn to the New York National Guard for a top flight example of conducting a security mission," Legwold said. "They have a set rules of engagement for individuals providing security, and how they implement their rotating security, how they set up their sites, how they work in an urban interagency environment with a significant number of stake holders and interagency partners - all of these are timely and important examples, along with lessons learned that can assist us in planning for any similar mission in the future."

Hellekson said that the visit put the homeland security picture into perspective - not only because of the large metropolitan areas surrounding Wisconsin, but the enduring threat potential in New York City.

"9/11 isn't that far back in their rear view mirror," Hellekson observed. "This isn't a scenario for them."