Dr. Kathleen Hicks, Deputy Secretary Of Defense;
Greg Pollock, Secretary Of Defense Chair, National War College
GREG POLLOCK: Good morning, all. My name is Greg
Pollock, and I am currently serving as the secretary of defense chair on
the National War College faculty. It's my great pleasure to introduce
our speaker today, the Honorable Dr. Kathleen Hicks, who was sworn in as
the 35th deputy secretary of defense on February 9th, 2021.
Prior to her nomination as deputy secretary, Dr. Hicks was the senior
vice president, Henry A. Kissinger chair, and director of the
International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies. Her confirmation as the deputy secretary is
something of a homecoming for Dr. Hicks, as she has served two prior
stints at the Pentagon, including in a series of senior roles from 2009
to 2013. She was previously confirmed by the Senate in 2012 as the
principal deputy undersecretary of defense for policy.
Deputy Secretary Hicks began her remarkable national defense career
as a civil servant in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 1993.
She served in a variety of positions over 13 years, ultimately rising
from presidential management intern to the senior executive service.
Dr. Hicks holds a Ph.D. in political science from the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, a master's from the University of Maryland's
School of Public Affairs, and a bachelor's degree from Mount Holyoke
College.
Welcome back to the War College, Dr. Hicks. On behalf of all the
faculty and students, I thank you so much for being here today, and the
floor is yours.
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE KATHLEEN HICKS: Great, thank you, Greg,
for that very kind introduction, and it is such a privilege for me to
have the opportunity to meet with the National War College Class of
2021.
Over the course of my career, I've had numerous occasions to come and
speak with students at National Defense University, including at the
War College, and I always enjoy the chance to interact with you, as well
as to have the opportunity that this venue provides for me to sharpen
my own thinking.
I very much wish we could be together in person this year. I know
that the COVID-19 pandemic has substantially altered the War College
experience, as it has changed virtually every aspect of our lives, and
certainly, of the department's operations.
I hope that you've nevertheless been able to engage the faculty and
resources this year to step back from the tactical and operational
aspects of your careers and deepen your thinking about the many
opportunities and challenges facing all of us in the years and decades
ahead.
But before I begin, I want to say that my heart is also with our
Asian-American community following this week's horrific violence. All
Americans share an obligation to stand up against hate in our
communities, and at the Department of Defense we will lead by example in
ensuring that every member of our force feels safe, respected, and
valued.
This morning, I want to provide several minutes of opening remarks,
but reserve the majority of our time together for a discussion with the
students, and I'll be happy at that time to answer some questions from
all of you.
I want to speak to you today about the decisions we are making and
actions that we are undertaking at the Department of Defense to continue
to sustain our technological and innovation edge over our military
competitors. And because Secretary Austin and I believe that the PRC is
the pacing challenge for the United States military, I will speak with a
particular focus on it.
Strategic competition is a defining feature of the 21st century. This
competition was not preordained or inevitable, but it was certainly
predictable. In its 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Defense
Department opined that the United States is the world's only superpower
today, and it is expected to remain so throughout the 1997-to-2015
period. But, it continued, in the period beyond 2015, there is the
possibility that a regional great power or global peer competitor may
emerge. The document then explicitly called out Russia and China as
having the potential to be such competitors.
Over the past several decades and across multiple administrations,
the economic security and governance differences between the United
States and the People's Republic of China have come into sharper focus.
During the Obama administration, the department joined with the rest of
the national security community in undertaking a rebalance or pivot to
Asia. More recently, the 2018 National Defense Strategy and the 2019
Commission on the National Defense Strategy, of which I was a member,
highlighted the growth of the People's Liberation Army's capabilities
and helped crystallize a bipartisan consensus around the defense
challenge.
Beijing has demonstrated increased military competence and a
willingness to take risks, and it has adopted a more coercive and
aggressive approach to the Indo-Pacific region. In 2020 alone, over a
host of issues, Beijing escalated tensions between itself and a number
of its neighbors, including Australia, Japan, Vietnam and the
Philippines. It was involved in an armed confrontation with India along
the line of actual control which resulted in the loss of life on both
sides and further tightened its grip on Hong Kong, including by
instituting an oppressive national security law. The PRC's actions
constitute a threat to regional peace and stability, and to the
rules-based international order on which our security and prosperity and
those of our allies depend.
Against this backdrop, President Biden recently released his interim
National Security Strategic Guidance, which highlights the PRC's
increasing assertiveness. The interim guidance notes that Beijing is the
only competitor potentially capable of combining its economic,
diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained
challenge to a stable and open international system.
To advance the interests of the American people and our democracy,
the United States must be able to compete for the future of our way of
life across all these dimensions. For the United States military, that
will often mean serving as a supporting player to diplomatic, economic,
and other soft power tools.
But it will also require the U.S. to demonstrate the will and
capability to credibly deter PRC aggression. As Secretary Austin said
earlier this week, during his visit to Japan, the U.S. Military, along
with its allies and partners, must have the capability to outmatch the
PLA.
As the deputy secretary of defense, I am particularly focused on
helping Secretary Austin ensure that DOD strategy is connected to its
resources. That connection runs directly and significantly through
concepts and capabilities. We must invest ourselves not only
financially, but also culturally in major change if we are to exploit
our advantages and close critical gaps to deter determined adversaries.
And I am confident that we are pos -- poised -- excuse me -- to do so
for a number of reasons. First, is his message to the force, Secretary
Austin made clear that DOD is committed to both innovation and
modernization. We will have a commitment to rapid experimentation, which
provides the needed space to test and refine innovative operational
concepts.
On the path to disruption, learning happens partly through failure,
but we will seek always to act with the trust of American taxpayers in
mind, and at reasonable risk.
Simply developing concepts and testing theories will not be enough.
We will also be committed to bridging the so-called valley of death,
ensuring we actually field needed capabilities in the force. Making room
for new capabilities will require difficult choices. Where the nation's
security needs are no longer being met, the department will work
closely with Congress to phase out systems and approaches optimized for
an earlier era.
We will also be attentive to making adjustments in the incentives
that drive how we invest, select talent, and innovate. We will be asking
fundamental questions, like how do civilian and military promotions
encourage a culture of innovation? Do we have the right skillsets in our
future force, and can we attract the nation's best talent in the coming
decade?
How can we, DOD, be a more reliable and agile partner and customer?
How do we secure our supply chains and ensure we have access to critical
technology? What transition approaches might be helpful to defense
communities and our industrial base, as we shift to future technologies?
And how does our global force management approach protect future
readiness and preserve states now for experimentation and exercises that
advance our operational art?
Secretary Austin and I are determined to work with military and
civilian leaders in the department, and with key partners in the
interagency, on Capitol Hill, and in the private and research sectors to
get after these questions.
A second reason I am confident we can deter adversaries effectively
is this administration's commitment to strengthening perhaps the United
States' greatest asymmetric advantage, our alliances and partnerships.
The ability of the United States to pursue common economic and
security goals with other nations is the cornerstone of our success,
which is why rivals are attempting actively to undermine trust in us.
For the U.S. military specifically, our defense relationships and the
networks between and among them strengthen interoperability, generate
common norms and respect for responsible international behavior across
domains, and deepen the agility of our collective global posture.
Third, the secretary and I know that meeting our greatest challenges
and advancing the department's priorities will require sustained
senior-level attention to the levers that create lasting institutional
change. Fundamental to our approach is the promotion of healthy
civil-military relations, which include civilian control of U.S. defense
and national security policy.
As the secretary has said before, the role and use of the U.S.
military must be clearly connected to the will of the American people.
Civilian control of the military, and unity of department action in
accordance with it, is vital to our success.
To that end, we are instilling discipline processes and governance
structures in the defense enterprise. This includes the explicit use of
bodies such as the Deputy's Management Action Group, also known as the
DMAG, to advance the secretary's commitment to innovation and
modernization.
Standing invitations to the DMAG have been extended to senior DOD
personnel such as the secretaries of the military's departments, chiefs
of the military services, combatant commanders, and OSD principal staff
assistance.
I have also established subordinate governance forums on defense
strategy and defense innovation, and will leverage existing bodies like
the Nuclear Weapons Council to help drive civilian and uniformed leaders
to build firm foundations for enduring change.
Through the deputy's newly created Workforce Council, we will bring
the same vision and disciplined execution to talent management that we
devote to weapons systems and budgets. A real, enduring, bipartisan
consensus has emerged around the multidimensional challenge that Beijing
presents.
Democrats and Republicans alike recognize that the Department of
Defense should and must prioritize the PRC as the pacing challenge for
the United States. As such, DOD should be confident that it will
continue to receive the support required to sustain our edge.
As the department begins the congressionally mandated process of
reviewing and revising its defense strategy, we must seek to ensure not
simply that we have the resources we need, but also that our military
concepts and capabilities can deter and, if needed, win against our most
challenging rivals. We must not only succeed in the competition of
ideas, but in the steadfastness of our execution.
Thank you all for allowing me the privilege of speaking with you today. I very much look forward to your questions.