Agency Officials Praise New START Treaty Progress

By Cheryl Pellerin

American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON  – Work taking place under the 16-month-old new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the United States and Russia fosters transparency and predictability for the world's two largest deployed nuclear arsenals, federal officials told a Senate panel today.

Among those testifying before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations were Rose Gottemoeller, acting undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, and Madelyn R. Creedon, assistant secretary of defense for global strategic affairs.

“Our experience so far demonstrates that the New START's verification regime works and will help push open the door to new and more complicated verification techniques in the future,” said Gottemoeller, who led the U.S. treaty negotiating team as assistant secretary of state for verification and compliance.

The Senate approved the treaty in 2010, and the related legislative process produced a federal commitment to spend $185 billion over 10 years to modernize nuclear warheads and delivery systems.

“When the treaty is fully implemented, it will result in the lowest number of deployed nuclear warheads since the 1950s, the first full decade of the nuclear age,” Gottemoeller said, “and 1,550 warheads deployed on or counted on 700 delivery vehicles -- that is, intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine launch ballistic missiles and bombers.”

When the first START treaty was signed in 1991, she added, the United States and the Soviet Union each had deployed about 10,550 nuclear warheads.

During the first year of the new treaty, the United States and Russia kept pace with each other in conducting inspections, she said, both completing the yearly maximum of 18 inspections. Today, each side can make 25 short-notice inspections a year, and inspections have taken place involving intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, heavy bombers at their operating bases, storage facilities, conversion or elimination facilities, and test ranges.

“Through inspection activities, we have acquired new and valuable information,” Gottemoeller told the panel. “For example, New START includes intrusive reentry vehicle inspections that are designed to confirm the exact number of re-entry vehicles, or warheads, on individual missiles selected for inspection. We are now able to confirm the exact number of warheads on any randomly selected Russian ICBM and SLBM -- something we were not able to do under the 1991 START treaty.”

The exhibition process, another aspect of treaty implementation, gives both parties a chance to see new kinds of strategic offensive arms, view distinguishing features and confirm declared data.

“The United States and Russian Federation have also been sharing a veritable mountain of data with each other,” the undersecretary said.

“Since entry into force we have exchanged over 2,500 notifications through our Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers,” she added. “They help track movement and changes in the status of systems on a day-in, day-out basis.

“That,” Gottemoeller continued, “combined with the databases that we exchange every six months, gives us an opportunity to have a kind of living database -- a truly real-time look at what is going on inside the Russian strategic forces.”

Testifying on the implications for U.S. nuclear forces and policy of the new START treaty, Creedon said implementation is proceeding successfully and the Defense Department is fully engaged in meeting its treaty obligations.

DOD has hosted multiple inspection activities at U.S. strategic facilities and has participated in reciprocal activities at Russian strategic facilities, the assistant secretary added.

“The United States is on track to complete the reductions necessary to comply with the New START treaty's central limits by February 2018,” Creedon said, adding that DOD plans to retain 240 deployed Trident SLBMs on Ohio-class submarines, up to 60 deployed heavy bombers and up to 420 single-warhead Minuteman III ICBMs.

“To meet the treaty's central limits,” she said, “the Obama administration plans to convert or eliminate a yet-to-be-determined combination of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers [and] our nuclear-capability heavy bombers.”

The service life of the department’s Trident II D5 SLBMs is being extended to 2042, and construction of the first Ohio-class replacement submarine is scheduled to begin in 2021, she added.

The administration plans to sustain Minuteman III ICBMs through 2030, and the United States will maintain two nuclear-capable B-52H strategic bomber wings and one B-2A wing.

The department also is working to complete a comprehensive drawdown plan, a substantial portion of which will be completed to support the fiscal 2014 budget request, Creedon added.

“As the president's budget request for fiscal year 2013 makes clear, DOD is committed to modernizing the delivery systems covered by the New START treaty that underpin nuclear deterrents,” the assistant secretary said.

Maintaining strategic stability, assuring allies and sustaining a safe, secure and effective deterrent requires a partnership between the executive branch and Congress, she added.

New START Treaty to Take Effect Feb. 5

By Cheryl Pellerin

American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Feb. 2, 2011 – With President Barack Obama scheduled to sign the new strategic arms reduction treaty with Russia today, the stage will be set for the formal exchange of papers later this week that will put the agreement into effect.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov are set to exchange ratification documents Feb. 5 at the Munich Security Conference, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates’ representative to the treaty negotiations said here yesterday.

Edward L. “Ted” Warner told the Pentagon Channel and American Forces Press Service that within 60 days of the treaty’s entry into force, both nations will have the right to conduct short-notice inspections of each other’s nuclear facilities.

“One of the crucial pieces of the more recent arms-reduction treaties, beginning with the START I treaty in the early 1990s, has been the provision for verification” of each other’s nuclear claims at operating bases, test ranges and storage sites, he said.

No inspections have taken place in either nation since START I expired in December 2009, he said, noting that the first START treaty represented “an enormous step forward in verification.”

The United States and Russia -- or its predecessor, the Soviet Union -- have signed a variety of strategic arms treaties going back to the early 1970s, Warner said. START I was signed in 1991 and ratified and entered into force in 1994. The Moscow Treaty in 2002 built on START I and lowered critical limits, particularly on deployed warheads, Warner said, noting that it expires in 2012.

“In the original START treaty, the limit was 6,000 warheads. In the Moscow Treaty, the limit was between 1,700 and 2,200 -- 2,200 being the legal limit,” he said. “In the new START treaty, which was concluded last April, the limit is now 1,550 strategic warheads.”

The U.S. Senate ratified the new START treaty Dec. 22, and the Russian parliament’s upper chamber ratified it Jan. 26.

The new treaty also limits strategic delivery vehicles, Warner added, which include intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers, such as the B-52H Stratofortress and the B-2 Spirit. The new treaty requires that each ICBM, submarine-launched ballistic missile and heavy bomber have a unique numerical identifier to aid verification, Warner said.

“That unique identifier is in the database,” he explained. “It’s provided during the pre-inspection briefing, and when inspectors go to inspect the individual items they are able to check that number.”

Each nation is allowed 18 short-notice inspections a year over 10 years, he added, “giving both sides the opportunity to confirm that the other side is complying with the provisions of the treaty.”

Both nations’ nuclear arsenals include strategic weapons carried on very long-range systems and nonstrategic, or tactical, nuclear weapons that can be delivered by tactical aircraft and used for antisubmarine warfare, Warner said.

No formal treaty ever has limited or reduced the weapons associated with shorter-range tactical delivery systems, Warner said. But during the ratification process for the new START treaty, he added, some senators said the next round of negotiated reductions should include tactical nuclear weapons in addition to long-range, strategic systems.

“This will be very much a challenge,” Warner said, “because virtually all of these weapons are in secure storage areas, and one of our highest priorities has been … to cooperate with the Russians through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to help finance improved security arrangements.

“So on one hand,” he continued, “we want to make sure they’re safe and secure, and on the other hand, we want to bring them into the negotiating process in order to reduce the overall numbers.”

Future nuclear weapons limitation treaties may expand to include nations besides the United States and Russia, Warner said.

“If you take the numbers down enough on the arsenals of Russia and the United States, then the other declared -- and some undeclared -- nuclear powers are likely to have to come into the equation,” he said.

Declared nuclear powers include the United Kingdom, France and China, Warner said. “Others that are undeclared include India, Pakistan and, it’s widely believed, Israel,” he added.

In the meantime, Warner said, “there’s probably one more major bilateral nuclear arms reduction negotiation, and hopefully, agreement ahead between the United States and Russia.”

Such a future negotiation may be one “in which we try to not only further reduce the strategic nuclear forces of Russia and the United States, but also fold in these nonstrategic weapons, the so-called tactical nuclear weapons,” he said.

“I think it is commonly agreed that they ought to be limited as well,” Warner added, “and people from both sides will be exploring, at official and nonofficial levels, how one might construct a treaty that would limit all nuclear warheads.”

That will be an important new challenge, he said.

“We have never limited the full set of strategic nuclear weapons themselves before,” Warner said, “so this will be virgin territory.”

NATO Sees Russia as Missile Defense Partner

By Donna Miles

American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Jan. 20, 2011 – Expressing confidence that the Russian parliament will ratify the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said he’s looking forward to moving ahead during the first half of 2011 on missile defense cooperation with Russia.

Rasmussen, speaking on his video blog posted yesterday, hailed the landmark decision between NATO and Russia at the alliance’s November summit in Lisbon, Portugal, and emphasized NATO’s “strong commitment to enhance and deepen our cooperation and to keep the spirit of Lisbon alive.”

NATO and Russia agreed at the summit to begin working together toward developing a continentwide missile defense system.

“For the first time, NATO nations and Russia will be cooperating to defend themselves,” Rasmussen said of the new missile defense cooperation. “Our citizens in Europe will share enhanced security, and that is unprecedented.”

Cooperation on missile defense is an important stepping stone toward development of the overall security relationship with Russia, he said. “It could be a vehicle for even further practical cooperation and confidence-building in the years to come,” he said.

“This is simple logic,” he added. “Increasingly, we share many threats to our common security.” As examples, he cited terrorism, the growing narcotics trade, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and piracy.

The missile defense system will protect people in NATO-member nations and Russia against the growing missile threat, Rasmussen said. He recognized that more than 30 nations have or are seeking a missile capability. “This is a development we cannot ignore,” he said.

As NATO and Russia evaluate the best ways to cooperate in missile defense, Rasmussen said, NATO envisions “two independent but coordinated systems, working back to back.”

This will offer several benefits, he explained. It will promote information exchange, provide a wider picture of the skies over Europe and with it, improved protection of Russian as well as allied territories.

Rasmussen said NATO will offer Russia transparency about its system that provides assurance that it isn’t –- and can’t be -– directed at Russia.

Also, by maintaining two independent systems, he said, both NATO and Russia can avoid “outsourcing our security to one another.”

“NATO security is based on collective defense,” he said. “And I assume that Russia, as a strong and independent nation, also wants to be fully in control of its defense systems.”

Rasmussen said he looks forward to “constructive discussions with Russia in the months ahead” that will build on commitments made at Lisbon.

Meanwhile, the Russia parliament is considering ratification of the New START Treaty. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed the treaty in Prague in April, and the U.S. Senate ratified it last month.

Defense Department Leaders Urge Treaty Ratification

By Karen Parrish

American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Dec. 8, 2010 – Senior Defense Department leaders strongly support the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, both for what it does and what it doesn’t do, a defense official said yesterday.

James N. Miller, principal deputy under secretary of defense for policy, detailed the department’s position on the treaty at the Brookings Institution here.

“The senior leaders of the military understand the treaty well, because DOD focused in detail on what we wanted from the treaty as we conducted the nuclear posture review,” he said.

The new treaty strengthens strategic stability with Russia, provides the United States flexibility to retain and modernize robust missile delivery systems, and advances U.S. security interests including nonproliferation, Miller said.

New START strengthens U.S.-Russia strategic stability by imposing equal limits on their strategic delivery systems and nuclear warheads, and by reinstituting verification measures, he said.

“Those limits are 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles, 800 combined deployed and nondeployed delivery vehicles, and 1,550 accountable strategic warheads, equal limits for both sides,” he said.

The United States and Russia have lacked mutual verification measures on strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems since Dec. 5 of last year when the previous START treaty expired.

“Since that time, the United States has had no boots on the ground for inspections of Russian [intercontinental ballistic missile] bases, bomber bases and other facilities,” Miller said. “And [new START’s] data collection provisions and exchange provisions will give us important insights into Russian strategic forces.”

Without verified information about Russian strategic forces, he said, the military will have to rely much more on worst-case planning, which would be both expensive and potentially destabilizing.

The flexibility new START provides, Miller said, is “that it allows us to choose our own force mix and to modernize our forces.”

The department's Nuclear Posture Review, conducted in parallel with treaty negotiations, “drove our negotiating positions on the treaty's key limits,” he said.

The treaty allows U.S. retention of its 14 strategic ballistic missile submarines, which Miller called “the most survivable” of the nation’s strategic delivery systems.

Land-based missiles and nuclear- or dual-capable bombers form the other two legs of the strategic nuclear weapon delivery “triad,” Miller said, adding that, together, the three systems “provide for strong deterrence of any attack on the United States or our allies.”

While U.S. officials agreed under the treaty to limit the number of warheads carried by those systems, in the case of a breach of the treaty, “the United States has the capability to upload a large number of additional warheads,” he said, “so that Russia could gain no real or perceived advantage.”

The third DOD objective the treaty accomplishes is advancing broader U.S. interests, Miller said, including nuclear nonproliferation, progress on tactical nuclear weapon agreements and sustaining momentum in U.S.-Russia relations.

“The biggest nuclear threat today is not from Russia, but from the danger of nuclear proliferation and the potential for nuclear terrorism,” he said. “Ratifying new START and making the associated reductions is key to meeting our obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This will help us strengthen the coalition to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear capability and help us prevent proliferation in the future.”

An agreement on tactical nuclear weapons likewise rests on adoption of the new treaty, Miller said, adding, “It is highly unlikely that we will get to those negotiations if new START is not ratified.”

New START is a link in the chain of recent successes in U.S.-Russia relations, Miller said, citing the Russian decision not to sell the S-300 anti-aircraft missile to Iran, and its agreement allowing the United States to move key supplies for Afghanistan through Russian territory.

What the treaty won’t do, Miller said, is constrain the United States from deploying the best missile defenses possible, limit the nation’s ability to develop conventional prompt global strike capabilities, or impair its ability to invest in the nuclear-weapons complex and infrastructure.

“Just a few weeks ago, NATO endorsed our proposal for territorial missile defense of Europe, the first time NATO has taken on this mission,” he said. “The administration plans to deploy all four phases of the so-called phased adaptive approach for European missile defense … and [we] are making investments and plans accordingly.”

With missile defense assured, Miller said, DOD is examining alternative concepts for future prompt global strike systems not limited by the treaty, such as the hypersonic glide vehicle.

“These systems have a number of advantages, including the ability to steer around countries to avoid overflight,” he said.

While it hasn’t reached final decision, the department plans to invest more than a billion dollars in research and development on conventional prime global strike over the next several years, he said.

Finally, new START doesn’t impair U.S. ability to invest in its nuclear-weapons complex and infrastructure, Miller reiterated.

“We plan to invest more than $85 billion over the next decade to modernize the U.S. nuclear-weapons complex that supports our deterrent,” he said. “This level of funding is necessary, and it's unprecedented since the end of the Cold War.”

“For what the treaty does and for what the treaty does not do, it's supported by the secretary of defense, as I said, all the joint chiefs and the commander, U.S. Strategic Command,” Miller said. “Our NATO allies also expressed strong support for new START at the Lisbon summit a few weeks ago. And finally, every president for the last several decades has pursued verifiable arms-control agreements, and the Senate has provided support.”

Miller said the START treaty, negotiated by presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, was approved in 1992 by 93 votes to 6. The Moscow Treaty, negotiated by President George W. Bush, was approved by 95 to 0 in 2003.

“It's time again, and DOD and the entire Obama administration are urging the Senate to give its advice and consent to ratification of the new START treaty this year,” Miller said.