Iranian National Extradited to the Western District of Texas for Illegally Exporting Military Sensitive Items from the U.S. to Iran

On Saturday, 38-year-old Merdad Ansari who is an Iranian citizen and a resident of the United Arab Emirates was extradited from Georgia and arrived Saturday evening in San Antonio to face federal charges in connection with a scheme to obtain military sensitive parts for Iran in violation of the Iranian Trade Embargo, announced Assistant Attorney General for National Security John C. Demers,  U.S. Attorney John F. Bash for the Western District of Texas; FBI San Antonio Division Special Agent in Charge Christopher Combs; Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) San Antonio Office Special Agent in Charge Shane Folden; Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) Southwest Field Office Special Agent in Charge Michael Mentalvos; and, Special Agent in Charge Tracy Martin, U.S. Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security's Office of Export Enforcement, Dallas Field Office.

These parts had dual-use military and civilian capability and could be used in such systems as: nuclear weapons, missile guidance and development, secure tactical radio communications, offensive electronic warfare, military electronic countermeasures (radio jamming), and radar warning and surveillance systems.

“As alleged, the defendant helped Iran to develop its weapons programs by obtaining military parts in violation of the Iranian Trade Embargo,” said Assistant Attorney General for National Security John C. Demers. “We are grateful for the work our partners have done to ensure Ansari can be brought to justice.”

“I am pleased that Mr. Ansari will face justice in an American courtroom.  I am grateful to the many law-enforcement partners who worked so diligently to make that happen,” stated U. S. Attorney John F. Bash for the Western District of Texas.

“The FBI greatly appreciates the collaborative efforts and unwavering support from the Georgian Government and our federal partners. Together, over several years, we relentlessly pursued every lead to ensure that Ansari would eventually face the charges detailed in the indictment,” stated FBI San Antonio Division Special Agent in Charge Christopher Combs. “Investigating criminal violations of U.S. trade embargoes is one of the FBI's highest priorities since this criminal activity affects the national security of the United States and our allies, especially the security of our troops abroad.”

“HSI will use all resources at its disposal to prevent sensitive technology from being illegally exported from the United States,” said Shane Folden, Special Agent in Charge, HSI San Antonio. “HSI commends all the agencies involved in this effort, their dedication and perseverance has brought this individual before the court to face justice.”

Ansari, and his co-defendant Mehrdad Foomanie (aka Frank Foomanie) of Iran, are charged in a federal grand jury indictment returned in June 2012 with conspiracy to violate the Iranian Transactions Regulations (ITR), conspiracy to launder money and conspiracy to commit wire fraud.  Foomanie remains a fugitive in this case.  In October 2012, a third co-defendant, Susan Yip (aka Susan Yeh), a citizen of Taiwan, was sentenced to two years in federal prison after pleading guilty to conspiring to violate the ITR by acting as a broker and conduit for Foomanie to buy items in the U.S. and have them unlawfully shipped to Iran.

According to the indictment, Foomanie also bought or attempted to buy items in the U.S. and arranged to have them unlawfully shipped to Iran through his companies in Iran (Morvarid Shargh Co. Ltd.); in Hong Kong (Panda Semiconductor and Foang Tech Inc., aka Ofogh Electronics Co.); and, in China (Ninehead Bird Semiconductor). The indictment also alleges that Ansari attempted to transship and transshipped cargo obtained from the U.S. by Yip and Foomanie using Ansari’s company, Gulf Gate Sea Cargo L.L.C., located in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. In her guilty plea, Yip admitted to primarily using her companies in Taiwan (Hivocal Technology Company, Ltd.; Enrich Ever Technologies Co., Ltd.; and, Kuang-Su Corporation) and in Hong Kong (Infinity Wise Technology; Well Smart (HK) Technology; Pinky Trading Co., Ltd.; and, Wise Smart (HK) Electronics Limited) to carry out the fraudulent scheme.

From Oct. 9, 2007, to June 15, 2011, the defendants obtained or attempted to obtain from companies worldwide over 105,000 parts valued at approximately $2,630,800 involving more than 1,250 transactions. The defendants conducted 599 transactions with 63 different U.S. companies where they obtained or attempted to obtain parts from U.S. companies without notifying the U.S. companies these parts were being shipped to Iran or getting the required U.S. Government license to ship these parts to Iran.

At no time did Yip, Foomanie, or Ansari, individually or through any of their companies, ever apply for or receive either a required U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) license or Department of Commerce export license to ship any item listed in this Indictment to the Republic of Iran.

The Iranian Transactions Regulations, renamed the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations in October 2012, prohibit, among other things, the exportation, re-exportation, sale or supply, directly or indirectly, to Iran or the Government of Iran, of any goods, technology or services from the U.S. or by a U.S. person. The embargo also prohibits any transaction by any U.S. person or within the U.S. that evades or avoids, or has the purpose of evading or avoiding, any prohibition set forth in the Executive Orders.

Upon conviction, Foomanie and Ansari faces up to 20 years in federal prison for conspiracy to violate the ITR, up to 20 years in federal prison for conspiracy to launder money and up to five years in federal prison for conspiracy to commit mail fraud.

It is important to note that an indictment is merely a charge and should not be considered as evidence of guilt. The defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty in a court of law.

The extradition occurred with substantial assistance from the Criminal Division’s Office of International Affairs and the Government of Georgia.

Former JBLM soldier sentenced to 15 years in prison for production of child pornography

Sentence to run concurrent with ten-year term imposed by U.S. Army

Tacoma, Washington – A former U.S. Army Chief Warrant Officer at Joint Base Lewis-McChord was sentenced today in U.S. District Court in Tacoma to 15 years in prison for production of child pornography, announced U.S. Attorney Brian T. Moran.  JOHN F. RINDT, 50, was previously sentenced to ten years in prison by a military tribunal for the same conduct.  U.S. District Judge Robert J. Bryan ordered the 15-year sentence to run concurrent to the military prison term.

According to records filed in the case, in 2012, while living in Lacey, Washington, RINDT made a video of himself molesting a sleeping child who was under the age of 12.  As part of his sentence, RINDT is required to pay $9,900 in restitution for counseling for the young child.

Following his release from prison, RINDT will be on lifetime supervised release and will be required to register as a sex offender.

The case was investigated by the FBI and U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID).

The case was prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney Grady Leupold.

Former DIA Employee Pleads Guilty to Leaking Classified National Defense Information to Journalists

An employee of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) pleaded guilty today to charges related to his disclosure of classified national defense information (NDI) to two journalists in 2018 and 2019.

“Frese violated the trust placed in him by the American people when he disclosed sensitive national security information for personal gain,” said Assistant Attorney General for National Security John C. Demers. “He alerted our country’s adversaries to sensitive national defense information, putting the nation’s security at risk.  The government takes these breaches seriously and will use all the resources at our disposal to apprehend and prosecute those who jeopardize the safety of this country and its citizens.”

“Henry Kyle Frese was entrusted with Top Secret information related to the national defense of our country,” said G. Zachary Terwilliger, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia. “Frese violated that trust, the oath he swore to uphold, and engaged in felonious conduct at the expense of our country. This case should serve as a clear reminder to all of those similarly entrusted with National Defense Information that unilaterally disclosing such information for personal gain, or that of others, is not selfless or heroic, it is criminal.”

“Mr. Frese violated his sworn oath to protect the American people and uphold the Constitution of the United States by using his access to the United States’ most sensitive information and steal state secrets for nothing more than personal gain,” said Robert Wells, Acting Assistant Director of the FBI's Counterintelligence Division. “The men and women of the FBI who investigated this case swore the same oath but unlike Mr. Frese, they chose to uphold it. I am proud of the work they did to hold Mr. Frese accountable for his actions.”

"By disseminating the same classified information he had pledged to protect, Henry Kyle Frese put the US and our national defense equities in danger," said Timothy R. Slater, Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI's Washington Field Office.  "The US Government and the American public depend on trusted government employees to keep such information out of the hands of our adversaries, who could use it to cause us harm.  The FBI's counterintelligence mission is to protect our country's information and secrets in order to safeguard our future; and the men and women of the FBI will continue to work hard to preserve that information."

According to court documents, Henry Kyle Frese, 31, of Alexandria, was employed by DIA as a counterterrorism analyst from February 2018 to October 2019, and held a Top Secret//Sensitive Compartmented Information security clearance. United States government agencies have confirmed that in the spring and summer of 2018, News Outlet 1 published eight articles, all authored by the same journalist (Journalist 1) that contained classified NDI that related to the capabilities of certain foreign countries’ weapons systems. These articles contained classified intelligence from five intelligence reports (the Compromised Intelligence Reports) made available to appropriately cleared recipients in the first half of 2018. The topic of all of these initial five Compromised Intelligence Reports – foreign countries’ weapons systems – was outside the scope of Frese’s job duties as an analyst covering CT topics. The media articles, and the intelligence reporting from which they were derived, both contained information that is classified up to the TS//SCI level, indicating that its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to result in exceptionally grave damage to the national security. The intelligence reporting was marked as such.

According to court documents, Frese and Journalist 1 lived together at the same residential address from January 2018 to November 2018. Throughout 2018 and 2019, Frese and Journalist 1 “followed” each other on Twitter, and on at least two occasions Frese re-Tweeted Journalist 1’s Tweets announcing the publications of articles containing NDI classified at the Top Secret level.

In or about April of 2018, Journalist 1 introduced Frese to a second journalist (Journalist 2).  Subsequently, Frese began texting and speaking with Journalist 2 by telephone. Between mid-2018 and late September 2019, Frese orally transmitted NDI classified at the Top Secret level to Journalist 1 on 12 separate occasions, and orally transmitted NDI classified at the Secret level to Journalist 1 on at least four occasions. Frese knew the information was classified at the Secret and Top Secret levels because the intelligence products from which he had learned the classified information had visible classification markings as to the classification level of the information, and the intelligence products accessed by Frese were stored on secure, classified government information systems.

In relation to one of the 12 times Frese orally transmitted Top Secret NDI to Journalist 1, in or about mid-April to early May 2018, Frese accessed an intelligence report unrelated to his job duties on multiple occasions, which contained NDI classified at the Top Secret//SCI level (Intelligence Report l). A week after Frese accessed Intelligence Report 1 for the second time, Frese received an April 27, 2018 Twitter Direct Message (DM) from Journalist 1 asking whether Frese would be willing to speak with Journalist 2. Frese stated that he was “down” to help Journalist 2 if it helped Journalist 1 “progress.” During the same April 27, 2018, Twitter exchange, Journalist 1 indicated that a certain United States military official told Journalist 2 that the official was not aware of the subject matter discussed in Intelligence Report 1. Frese characterized the official’s denial as “weird” and commented on the source of information contained within Intelligence Report 1.

Several days after the April 27, 2018, Twitter exchange, Frese searched on a classified United States government computer system for terms related to the topics contained in Intelligence Report 1. A few hours after searching for terms related to the topic of Intelligence Report l, Frese spoke by telephone with Journalist 1, and several hours later he spoke by telephone with Journalist 2.  Immediately after the call with Journalist 2, Journalist 1 called Frese. During at least one of the calls with Journalist 1 and Journalist 2, Frese orally passed Top Secret NDI derived from Intelligence Report 1. Approximately 30 minutes after Frese spoke with the two journalists, Journalist 1 published an article (Article 1) which contained Top Secret NDI, orally communicated by Frese and derived from Intelligence Report 1 classified at the Top Secret//SCI level.

On at least 30 separate occasions in 2018, Frese conducted searches on classified government systems for information regarding the classified topics he discussed with Journalists 1 and 2. On multiple occasions in 2018 and 2019, Frese conducted searches on classified government systems because of specific requests for information from Journalists 1 and 2.

Additionally, between early 2018 and October 2019, Frese communicated with an employee of an overseas CT consulting group (Consultant 1) via social media. On at least two occasions, Frese transmitted classified NDI related to CT topics to Consultant 1, using a social media site’s direct messaging feature.

Frese pleaded guilty to the willful transmission of Top Secret national defense information, and faces a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison when sentenced on June 18, 2020, at 9:30 am. Actual sentences for federal crimes are typically less than the maximum penalties. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after taking into account the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Neil Hammerstrom and Danya E. Atiyeh, and Trial Attorney Jennifer Kennedy Gellie of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section are prosecuting the case.