HQ AMC Flight Safety
2/4/2014 - Spring 2014 -- At the end of the day, at the end of each flight, what is my goal? It's to go home after safely flying, and it's even sweeter if the airplane is A-1 and ready to fly again. So, if the takeoff and mission employment phase go well, what else can go wrong? At AMC Safety, and in operations under FAA oversight, a consistently large number of events keep aircrew from going home happy. It's the landing phase--more specifically, runway excursions (Flight Safety Foundation, 2013).
What is a runway excursion? Simply stated, a runway excursion is off-roading with an airplane due to landing short of the runway, failing to stop by the end of the runway, or driving off the side of the runway. So, why did I elect to write about this? In recent history, there have been some significant landing errors. In one event, a C-130 landed long, departed an AOR runway, and was destroyed. Shortly before that event, a C-17 departed a snow covered runway and was significantly damaged. More recently, two AMC aircraft landed short of the intended runways, one with Class A damage and luckily, the second suffered no damage. Evidence exists of other short touchdowns, but aircraft were not damaged in those events. Finally, an aircrew narrowly avoided a tragedy by recognizing at the last moment that they were about to touch down two miles short of their runway--on a house.
To accomplish a glorious safe landing as a superhero of the not-so-friendly skies, you must be able to identify your landing zone and touchdown point properly. This identification process is macro initially and is refined to a smaller micro perspective as the aircraft approaches the runway.
"What do I expect to see?" Initially, pilots look at the field relative to arrival, the runway configuration, and its relationship to surroundings. As we get closer to the field, we look for lights, painted markings, panels, runway surface condition, and barriers that may present hazards to a safe landing. This mental model of what we anticipate at a field is built during mission planning and then reviewed and updated during the arrival/approach brief. Of note, Line Operations Safety Audits (LOSA) and mishap investigations have shown trends of insufficient approach and arrival briefings--maybe the mental model isn't sufficiently formed.
"What if what I see does not match my expectation?" If you have been thoroughly briefed and the airfield in view is not representative of the expected mental model, it may be time to rethink your landing decision. From this point in on the approach, you have to decide where to put rubber to asphalt, concrete, or dirt. This decision will be driven by your Takeoff and Landing Distance (TOLD) calculations and any other special guidance for your aircraft. This may sound simple for anyone who has graduated pilot training, but mishaps point to crew misinterpretations of TOLD numbers meanings. The crew must know where you plan to touchdown, where you expect to stop or exit the runway, and what point drives a go-around if touchdown has not occurred.
In the C-17, crews use a descent technique for determining when we have gone past our latest touchdown point. This highly technical method is based on counting "one potato" beyond the time the end-of-assault-zone line or panel passes the cockpit. Adding to the accuracy is that this is all based on your task-divided peripheral vision. As I sat contemplating this article, it occurred to me that I did not have a good technique for visually identifying a short touchdown when mission circumstances dictate the aircraft touchdown very precisely in the first 500 feet. This becomes even more critical with the common C-17 technique of aiming for the first third of that 500-foot zone.
Have I ever feared for my life based on this situation? No. However, if you look at satellite photos of assault zones, it's apparent there is a lack of ability to recognize a potential short touchdown. This visual is in direct contrast to the relatively few long landing tire marks. I encourage you to consider this issue, discuss it in your squadrons and wing, and hangar fly it. Though a manpower obligation, an assault zone monitor (think RSU controller) could sit in a vehicle alongside the assault zone and provide instant feedback to the aircrew as to their touchdown point. This would inevitably build accurate mental models of what a "good" landing is. Currently, Charleston's North Field implements a variation of this proposal.
Without a fail-safe outside observer to tell us where we touch down, how can we help ourselves? Our first line of defense is solid training, coupled with a clear understanding of use and application of T.O., AFI, and TTP guidance, as well as practice of sound risk management. Build a mental model to provide expectations, and conduct thorough briefs to ensure all crewmembers are aware of the objective, pitfalls, and go-around points. Understand the T.O. 1-1 TOLD implications; understand FMC/FMS inputs and outputs. Safe operations always begin with the basics!
If you find yourself questioning whether the approach should continue, frame the decision with the following question: "What would the SIB say about my decision?" You are the advocate for the Air Force, your crew and passengers, their families, and the mission. It doesn't matter what crew position you are in or how junior you are--you have an obligation to help ensure you can go home happy.
Runway Excursion Risk Reduction Toolkit http://flightsafety.org/current-safety-initiatives/runway-safety-initiative-rsi/runway-excursion-risk-reduction-rerr-toolkit
Approach and Landing Accident Reduction http://flightsafety.org/current-safety-initiatives/approach-and-landing-accident-reduction-alar Flight Safety Foundation (2013)
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