By Ken White
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
SPRINGFIELD, Va., Oct. 18, 2012 – Fifty years after they
discovered Soviet missiles poised to strike the United States from Cuba,
two intelligence officers met with hundreds of their current-day
counterparts to commemorate the anniversary of the crisis that nearly
brought the world to nuclear war.
National
Photographic Interpretation Center imagery kept President John F.
Kennedy updated on progress made by the Soviets on their missile site in
Cuba. This Oct. 25, 1962, image shows all the elements necessary to
launch a missile with a 1,100 nautical mile range. Analysts could tell
by the tracks in the ground leading to one of the missile shelter tents
that a weapon in a high state of readiness was present. The image also
demonstrated the Soviets’ extensive use of canvas to camouflage its
weapons components and, therefore, its intentions. Photo courtesy of
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
(Click photo for screen-resolution image);high-resolution image available. |
|
Dino Brugioni and Vincent DiRenzo were part of a small group from
the CIA’s National Photographic Interpretation Center who worked for 13
tense days in October 1962 to avert disaster. They joined author and
journalist Michael Dobbs, and two current analysts, in an Oct. 15 panel
discussion at the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency here.
Through reminiscences and present-day observations, the group
illustrated the significance of the crisis and its continued impact on
the tradecraft of imagery and geospatial analysis.
A photo
interpreter, DiRenzo led the NPIC team and formed the initial conclusion
about the presence of Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba
from analysis of U-2 spy plane imagery. He discussed the immediate wake
of his discovery.
"Considering the severity of the
identification, we figured we'd be in for a long night," DiRenzo said.
He indicated that the initial assessment was not a "slam dunk," as
convincing people of the true significance of the find was difficult.
While DiRenzo was absolutely sure, the image did not show clearly
identifiable missiles, but rather, long, canvas-covered objects that, to
the layman, could be almost anything.
Charged with preparing
materials on daily developments for NPIC Director Arthur C. Lundahl’s
briefs to the executive committee and the White House, Brugioni was
instrumental in arming President John F. Kennedy with intelligence
needed to navigate this perilous moment in history.
He recalled
with humor how many of his briefing boards came back from the White
House marked up with blue crayon from a doodling Caroline Kennedy. On a
more somber note, he also relayed the fearful mood of the time.
"Black Saturday, we had gone to [defense readiness condition] 2,"
Brugioni said. "Fourteen hundred bombers were loaded with nuclear
weapons; 50 B-52s were in the air; eight Polaris submarines were at sea;
125 [intercontinental ballistic missiles] were ready to fire; there was
tactical aviation; there was 60 Thor missiles in England, 30 Jupiter
missiles in Italy, and 15 Jupiters in Turkey. That morning we met with
Art Lundahl and told him that all 24 pads were operational, meaning that
within four to six hours, 24 missiles could be coming at the United
States.
“I remember Lundahl scratching his chin, looked at me and
said, ‘I don't want to scare the hell out of them, but I want to make
sure they understand the danger,’" Brugioni recalled.
The son of a
career diplomat, Dobbs spent his formative years behind the Iron
Curtain. He became a Cold War scholar after covering it as a foreign
correspondent for the Washington Post. He drew a parallel between his
work and intelligence analysis.
"I feel a kinship with
intelligence analysts. We try to start with the evidence and proceed
from the evidence to the conclusions,” Dobbs said. “Our goal is to tell
truth to power."
Dobbs went on to laud the efforts of the team
who identified the missiles, and to praise Brugioni for his efforts
since the crisis to improve public understanding of photo analysis.
"Dino has done more than anyone else to explain the art and science of
photo interpretation to the broader public," he said. "He's a great
educator; he's very good at explaining very complicated matters to
laymen."
He also discussed how his research of the crisis, with
the advantage of 50 years of hindsight, affirmed both the significance
the crisis and the criticality of intelligence to policymaking. He also
pointed out that 60 to 70 percent of the actionable intelligence came
from NPIC during the crisis.
"This was the moment of the photo
interpreter," Dobbs said. "They were able to tell [the president] when
the missiles would be ready to fire."
It was probably the single biggest intelligence coup of the Cold War, he added.
Art Lundahl’s son, Robert, shared his late father's connection with the president.
"Above all, my father was certainly a technologist. He was a scientist
at heart; he loved
technology," said the younger Lundahl. "It sounded
like President Kennedy had an equal interest in technology. There was a
bond there."
Beyond technology, Lundahl also shared what he
believes to be the key to his father’s effectiveness as an intelligence
officer: exceptional communication skills.
"He was born to
brief," Lundahl said. Specifically, he noted his father’s ability to be
credible, while adjusting to the knowledge level of his audience and
using humor to diffuse tension.
NGA analyst Walter S. Trynock
compared and contrasted the world of 1962 with today’s environment.
Communication skills remain critical for analysts, he noted, but the
tools for providing geospatial intelligence are markedly different, and
today’s leaders are bombarded with information.
"The type of
information, and the pace in which information is received by the
policymaker, is constant, at all times of the day and night," Trynock
said. "So the challenge is to bring out the relevancy and the 'so what'
to contribute to their decision making.”
Then and now, keen analysis always has been key, Dobbs said.
"Intelligence is like a huge jigsaw puzzle, and you only find a few
pieces, and there are always going to be some missing pieces, but from
the pieces you do find, you try to inform policymakers about the entire
jigsaw puzzle," he said.
Posts
