Arizona National Guard service members at a food bank prepared boxes of groceries to be delivered to area residents in Queen Creek, Ariz., Sept. 20, 2021. As of Sept. 20, 2021, the Arizona National Guard has completed 8,944 food bank missions, handed out 1,747,238 units of food, prepared and served 943,765 meals, conducted 849 transportation missions with more than 1,091,934 miles driven, completed more than 700 covid testing site missions and 1,537 vaccination missions.
Sept. 28, 2021 | , DOD News
In a speech earlier this year, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III called deterrence the cornerstone of defense to make sure U.S. adversaries know that the risk of aggression is out of line with any conceivable benefit, a key Defense Department official said today.
Gregory M. Kausner, performing the duties of undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, was the keynote speaker at the Common Defense 2021 expo this morning.
"In describing a new vision of 'integrated deterrence,' he [Austin] said that while it still rests on the same logic, it now spans multiple realms," Kausner said. "The right mix of technology, operational concepts and capabilities — all woven together and networked in a way that is credible, flexible and so formidable that it will give any adversary pause."
That approach is multi-domain, spans numerous geographic areas of responsibility, is united with allies and partners, and is fortified by all instruments of national power, he said.
"For those of us in the acquisition and sustainment enterprise, the concept of integrated deterrence is a call to action," Kausner said.
DOD must continue to evolve its policies, processes — and, most importantly, its culture — to ensure the United States and its network of allies and partners remain predominant across the 21st century battlespace, he said.
The purpose in DOD's acquisition and sustainment is to enable the delivery and sustainment of secure, resilient and preeminent capabilities to the warfighter and international partners, Kausner emphasized.
As defense acquisition has evolved, the geopolitical landscape of today calls for an integrated suite of capabilities to field a lethal, resilient and rapidly adapting joint force, he said.
"Developing such capabilities should be guided by mission engineering — a means to achieve desired warfighting effects through scoped requirements, guided development, and informed investment — to directly link programs with the missions they must accomplish," he explained.
"Put simply, the mission architecture is the business model for the conduct of operations," he noted. Kausner also added that, as overarching mission architecture is illuminated, DOD is able to identify critical mission threads and the necessary end-to-end tasks.
Kausner said the acquisition enterprise must center the force of its considerable resources, ingenuity and expertise on the critical linkages that enable warfighters to complete the kill chain.
In recent years, DOD began that process with a comprehensive redesign of its acquisition policies. The result was the adaptive acquisition framework -- one of the most transformational changes to defense acquisition in years, he said.
With six distinct pathways, Kausner said the framework empowers program teams to tailor their approaches to a specific capability, making DOD more agile and more disciplined in addressing acquisition challenges at the program level.
Kausner said that to ensure a ready workforce, DOD is putting in place a comprehensive talent management framework focused on streamlining certification requirements, expanding job-relevant credentialing opportunities, and providing a continuous learning model. It's also adopting best-practices to optimize our performance.
Kausner said that DOD is also evolving into a data-centric enterprise, one that uses data at speed and scale for operational advantage and increased efficiency.
And while DOD is just scratching the surface, there's an imperative to advance defense acquisition at the enterprise level, he said. A holistic approach to enterprise acquisition is necessary — one that integrates policies and processes at the micro level, but also aligns other key aspects of defense acquisition at the macro level, he explained.
Kausner said that to identify and address interdependencies and critical risks, DOD must broaden its assessments to include a portfolio of systems. The department is adopting integrated acquisition portfolio reviews to strengthen synchronization of warfighting concepts, requirements, technologies and program execution.
"We are in the midst of a rebalance from a program-centric approach to a portfolio-based perspective," he said. "For example, instead of looking only at a specific munition, we're more focused on how that system fits into the broader integrated air and missile defense capability portfolio," he explained.
Such an outlook enables DOD to not only see all the dots, but to connect them to directly align decision making with operational needs, Kausner said.
"We can expect adversaries to challenge our logistics dominance from the homeland to the outer reaches of the battlespace," he said, adding that cross-cutting portfolio reviews will highlight the impact of contested logistics by evaluating material shortages, munitions levels and fuel supply chains across a range of systems.
"Climate change will also continue to alter our operational environment," he said. "Going forward, portfolio reviews will assess the efficacy of both our emerging programs and our supporting infrastructure in the face of shifting environments."
Adopting a portfolio perspective will also enable a healthy, vibrant, and — most importantly — a viable defense industrial base now and into the future, Kausner said.
Sept. 28, 2021
As part of the department’s one-year response to Executive Order (EO) 14017, America’s Supply Chains, the Department of Defense published a Federal Register Notice (FRN) soliciting comments from industry on key supply chain challenges and recommendations to strengthen the defense industrial base.
The department seeks comments about supply chain vulnerabilities and opportunities in four focus areas: select kinetic capabilities, energy storage/batteries, microelectronics, and castings and forgings. The department also welcomes inputs on vulnerabilities across five systemic enablers in these supply chains, including: workforce, cyber posture, interoperability, small business, and manufacturing.
Details regarding the four focus areas and five systemic enablers are provided in the FRN, in addition to specific questions for response. The focus areas and strategic enablers were selected through ongoing supply chain analysis efforts across the department, interagency, and White House, and align with the secretary’s guidance.
Input from industry partners is critical to the department’s efforts to address supply chain challenges in the defense industrial base. While the FRN is the primary avenue through which DoD is collecting written feedback from industry, the Office of Industrial Policy will also leverage existing industry engagements and ad hoc events to solicit feedback over the coming months. DoD’s one-year report in response to EO 14017 will be published in February 2022.
The Federal Register Notice is open until Oct. 13, 2021. The original language of Executive Order 14017 and the 100-day assessment published on June 4, 2021 can both be found on the White House website.
Sept. 28, 2021
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, members of the committee: thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss our recent drawdown and evacuation operations in Afghanistan.
I am pleased to be joined by Generals Milley and McKenzie, who I know will be able to provide you with additional context.
I am incredibly proud of the men and women of the U.S. armed forces, who conducted themselves with tremendous skill and professionalism throughout the war, the drawdown, and the evacuation.
Over the course of our nation’s longest war, 2,461 of our fellow Americans made the ultimate sacrifice, along with more than 20,000 who still bear the wounds of war, some of which cannot be seen on the outside.
We can discuss and debate the decisions, the policies, and the turning points since April of this year, when the President made clear his intent to end American involvement in this war. We can debate the decisions over 20 years that led us to this point.
But one thing not open to debate is the courage and compassion of our service members, who – along with their families – served and sacrificed to ensure that our homeland would never again be attacked the way it was on September 11, 2001.
I had the chance to speak with many of them during my trip to the Gulf region a few weeks ago, including the Marines who lost 11 of their teammates at the Abbey Gate in Kabul on the 26th of August. I have never been more humbled and inspired. They are rightfully proud of what they accomplished, and the lives they saved, in such a short span of time.
The reason that our troops were able to get there so quickly is because we planned for just such a contingency. We began thinking about the possibilities for a non-combatant evacuation as far back as this spring.
By late April, two weeks after the President’s decision, military planners had crafted a number of evacuation scenarios. In mid-May, I ordered Central Command to make preparations for a potential non-combatant evacuation operation. Two weeks later, I began pre-positioning forces in the region, to include three infantry battalions. On the 10th of August, we ran another table- top exercise around a non-combatant evacuation scenario. We wanted to be ready. And we were.
By the time that the State Department called for the NEO, significant
numbers of additional forces had already arrived in Afghanistan,
including leading elements of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, who
were already on the ground in Kabul. Before that weekend was out,
another 3,000 or so ground troops had arrived, including elements of the
82nd Airborne.
To be clear, those first two days were difficult. We all watched with alarm the images of Afghans rushing the runway and our aircraft. We all remember the scenes of confusion outside the airport. But within 48 hours, our troops restored order, and process began to take hold.
Our soldiers, airmen, and Marines – in partnership with our allies, our partners, and our State Department colleagues – secured the gates, took control of airport operations, and set up a processing system for the tens of thousands of people they would be manifesting onto airplanes. They and our commanders exceeded all expectations.
We planned to evacuate between 70,000-80,000 people. They evacuated more than 124,000.
We planned to move between 5,000-9,000 people per day. On average, they moved slightly more than 7,000 per day.
On military aircraft alone, we flew more than 387 sorties, averaging nearly 23 per day. At the height of this operation, an aircraft was taking off every 45 minutes. And not a single sortie was missed for maintenance, fuel, or logistical problems.
It was the largest airlift conducted in U.S. history, and it was executed in just 17 days. Was it perfect? Of course not. We moved so many people so quickly out of Kabul that we ran into capacity and screening problems at intermediate staging bases outside of Afghanistan.
We are still working to get Americans out who wish to leave. We did not get out all of our Afghan allies enrolled in the Special Immigrant Visa program. We take that very seriously. That is why we are working across the interagency to continue facilitating their departure. Even with no military presence on the ground, that part of our mission is not over.
Tragically, lives were also lost: several Afghans killed climbing aboard an aircraft on that first day; 13 brave U.S. service members and dozens of Afghan civilians killed in a terrorist attack on the 26th; and we took as many as 10 innocent lives in a drone strike on the 29th.
Non-combatant evacuations remain among the most challenging military operations, even in the best of circumstances. And the circumstances in August were anything but ideal. Extreme heat. A land-locked country. No government. A highly dynamic situation on the ground. And an active, credible, and lethal terrorist threat.
In the span of just two days – from August 13th to 15th – we went from working alongside a democratically elected, long-time partner government to coordinating warily with a long-time enemy. We operated in a deeply dangerous environment. It proved a lesson in pragmatism and professionalism.
We learned a lot of other lessons, too – about how to turn an Air
Force base in Qatar into an international airport overnight, and about
how to rapidly screen, process, and manifest large numbers of people.
Nothing like this has ever been done before, and no other military in
the world could have pulled it off. I think that is crucial.
I know that members of this committee will have questions on many things, such as why we turned over Bagram Airfield, how real is our over-the-horizon capability, why we didn’t start evacuations sooner, and why we did not stay longer to get more people out. Let me take each in turn.
Retaining Bagram would have required putting as many as five thousand U.S. troops in harm’s way, just to operate and defend it. And it would have contributed little to the mission that we had been assigned: to protect and defend our embassy some 30 miles away. That distance from Kabul also rendered Bagram of little value in the evacuation. Staying at Bagram – even for counter- terrorism purposes – meant staying at war in Afghanistan, something that the President made clear he would not do.
As for over-the-horizon operations: when we use that term, we refer to assets and target analysis that come from outside the country in which the operation occurs. These are effective, and fairly common, operations. Just days ago, we conducted one such strike in Syria, eliminating a senior Al Qaeda figure. Over-the-horizon operations are difficult but absolutely possible. And the intelligence that supports them comes from a variety of sources, not just U.S. boots on the ground.
As for when we started evacuations: we offered input to the State Department’s decision, mindful of their concerns that moving too soon might actually cause the very collapse of the Afghan government that we all wanted to avoid, and that moving too late would put our people and our operations at greater risk. As I said, the fact that our troops were on the ground so quickly is due in large part to our planning and pre-positioning of forces.
As for the mission’s end: my judgment remains that extending beyond the end of August would have greatly imperiled our people and our mission. The Taliban made clear that their cooperation would end on the first of September, and as you know, we faced grave and growing threats from ISIS-K. Staying longer than we did would have made it even more dangerous for our people and would not have significantly changed the number of evacuees who we could get out.
As we consider these tactical issues today, we must also ask ourselves some equally tough questions about the wider war itself, and pause to think about the lessons that we have learned over the past 20 years. Did we have the right strategy? Did we have too many strategies? Did we put too much faith in our ability to build effective Afghan institutions – an army, an air force, a police force, and government ministries?
We helped build a state, but we could not forge a nation. The fact that the Afghan army we and our partners trained simply melted away – in many cases without firing a shot – took us all by surprise. It would be dishonest to claim otherwise.
We need to consider some uncomfortable truths: that we did not fully
comprehend the depth of corruption and poor leadership in their senior
ranks, that we did not grasp the damaging effect of frequent and
unexplained rotations by President Ghani of his commanders, that we did
not anticipate the snowball effect caused by the deals that Taliban
commanders struck with local
leaders in the wake of the Doha agreement, that the Doha agreement
itself had a demoralizing effect on Afghan soldiers, and that we failed
to fully grasp that there was only so much for which
– and for whom – many of the Afghan forces would fight.
We provided the Afghan military with equipment and aircraft and the skills to use them. Over the years, they often fought bravely. Tens of thousands of Afghan soldiers and police officers died. But in the end, we couldn’t provide them with the will to win. At least not all of them.
As a veteran of that war, I am personally reckoning with all of that. But I hope, as I said at the outset, that we do not allow a debate about how this war ended to cloud our pride in the way that our people fought it. They prevented another 9/11, they showed extraordinary courage and compassion in the war’s last days, and they made lasting progress in Afghanistan that the Taliban will find difficult to reverse and that the international community should work hard to preserve.
Now, our service members and civilians face a new mission: helping these Afghan evacuees move on to new lives in new places. They are performing that one magnificently, as well. I spent time with some of them up at Joint Base Maguire-Dix-Lakehurst, just yesterday. I know that you share my profound gratitude and respect for their service, courage, and professionalism.
And I appreciate the support that this committee continues to provide them and their families. Thank you.
Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III announced today that the President has made the following nomination:
Air Force Brig. Gen. Randall E. Kitchens for appointment to the grade of major general with assignment as the chief of chaplains, Headquarters United States Air Force, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. Kitchens is currently serving as the deputy chief of chaplains, Office of the Chief of Chaplains, Headquarters United States Air Force, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
An airman assembles a munition for Global Strike Challenge 2021 at Barksdale Air Force Base, La., Sep. 21, 2021.
A Marine fast-ropes out of a UH-1Y Venom helicopter during UNITAS, the world's longest-running annual multinational maritime exercise, in Ancon, Peru, Sept. 26, 2021.
A soldier participates in a jungle operations training course at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, Sept. 23, 2021.
Sept. 28, 2021 | , DOD News
Football players have often been idolized and even been seen as heroes by generations of Americans.
Four football players served in the military and were killed in action. For paying the ultimate sacrifices, they can be listed as some of America's greatest heroes.
Al Blozis won Amateur Athletic Union and National Collegiate Athletic Association indoor and outdoor shot titles three years in a row from 1940 to 1942 while attending Georgetown University. In 2015, he was inducted into the National Track and Field Hall of Fame.
In 1942, Blozis pivoted from track and field to football. He was drafted into the National Football League and played offensive tackle for the New York Giants in 1942 and 1943.
In December of 1943, he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Army but took leave in early 1944 to play three more games for the Giants.
In 1944, Blozis departed for France with the 28th Infantry Division. On Jan. 31, 1945, while scouting enemy lines in the Vosges Mountains of France, he was shot and killed by enemy fire.
Jack Lummus was a baseball center fielder at Baylor University from 1937 to 1940. He was considered the best center fielder who ever played at Baylor.
In 1941, he played nine games as a New York Giants rookie end.
On Jan. 30, 1942, he enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserve. In October 1942, he was commissioned a second lieutenant.
After serving at Camp Pendleton, California, he deployed to the Western Pacific, assigned to the V Amphibious Corps.
Lummus was in the first wave of troops to land on Iwo Jima, Feb. 19, 1945. On March 8, 1945, he led his rifle platoon in fierce fighting at the northern end of the island.
The lieutenant single-handedly knocked out three enemy strongholds which had prevented his platoon from reaching their objective. He was killed during the assault after stepping on an enemy landmine. For his valor, Lummus was awarded the Medal of Honor.
Don Steinbrunner was selected in the 1953 NFL draft by the Cleveland Browns as an offensive tackle. He played in the 1953 NFL Championship Game at Briggs Stadium in Detroit, but the Browns lost 17–16 to the Detroit Lions.
The following year, he left the NFL to fulfill his military requirements by joining the Air Force. He liked serving and decided to make the Air Force a career.
In 1966, Steinbrunner, then a major, was deployed to Vietnam as an aircraft navigator. On July 20, 1967, his C-123 Provider aircraft was shot down by enemy fire, killing him and four other crewmen.
Pat Tillman was a linebacker for Arizona State University in the mid-1990s. In 1998, he was drafted by the NFL and picked up by the Arizona Cardinals, playing the safety position.
In 2002, Tillman turned down a $3.6 million contract for three more years with the Cardinals to enlist in the Army.
He participated in the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003 and then graduated from Ranger School later that year.
In 2004, he deployed to Afghanistan, and on April 22 of that year, he was killed by friendly fire.
Sept. 28, 2021
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense (MND) held the 20th Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD) September 27-28, 2021 in Seoul, Republic of Korea. Deputy Minister for National Defense Policy (DEPMIN), Mr. Kim Man-gi, led the ROK delegation. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for East Asia, Dr. Siddharth Mohandas, led the U.S. delegation. Key U.S and ROK defense and foreign affairs officials also participated. Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (A/ASD) for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities, Ms. Melissa Dalton, and Dr. Mohandas together co-chaired the Deterrence Strategy Committee (DSC) session of the KIDD opposite DEPMIN Kim.
During the KIDD, the ROK and U.S. delegations reaffirmed a shared goal of achieving the complete denuclearization of, and permanent peace on, the Korean Peninsula and pledged that the U.S. and ROK combined forces would remain ready and postured to defend the ROK. The two sides acknowledged the third year of the inter-Korean Comprehensive Military Agreement, assessing that it—in addition to the continued enforcement and management of the Armistice Agreement by the United Nations Command—has contributed to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The leaders discussed DPRK’s recent missiles launches and agreed to explore enhancements to the Alliance’s defense posture to account for omnidirectional threats. Both leaders underscored the importance of diplomacy and the resumption of dialogue to address these changes.
During the Security Policy Initiative (SPI), both sides reaffirmed that the U.S.-ROK Alliance remains the linchpin of peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and in the Northeast Asia Region, and committed to seeking measures to further deepen and expand the Alliance. Both leaders lauded the ratification of the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) as a critical achievement in maintaining the U.S.-ROK Alliance, and ensuring the steady stationing of U.S. forces in the ROK. Additionally, both sides shared the common understanding that the Fall 2021 Combined Command Post Training (CCPT) played an important role in maintaining ROK-U.S. combined defense posture.
The leaders also acknowledged significant progress toward the return of Yongsan Garrison to the ROK, consistent with the Yongsan Relocation Plan. Both sides concurred on the importance of creating stable and unfettered access to training facilities, resources, and other sites critical to the U.S.-ROK combined defense posture and military readiness. The leaders also reviewed the progress made in the combined joint multi-purpose live fire range joint study and discussed the way ahead to ensure progress in advance of the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) later this fall. Both sides pledged to deepen cooperation in other domains including cyber and space to ensure an effective joint response against emerging threats and to maintain a free, safe, and prosperous, Indo-Pacific region. Additionally, the two sides shared the common understanding regarding the importance of ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral security cooperation, based on shared security interests among the three countries. The two leaders also pledged to strengthen cooperation to maintain the rules-based international order. Furthermore, both sides committed to cooperate to better align U.S. and ROK regional strategies, including the ROK New Southern Policy and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy.
During the Conditions-Based Operational Control Transition Working Group (COTWG), both leaders acknowledged the great progress made towards the transition of wartime Operational Control (OPCON) to the Future Combined Forces Command (F-CFC) and reaffirmed a mutual commitment to the bilaterally agreed upon Conditions-based OPCON Transition Plan (COTP). In particular, the two sides affirmed the progress of wartime OPCON transition tasks conducted this year, including the comprehensive joint study on COTP capabilities.
During the DSC, the two sides discussed combined deterrence and response concepts to strengthen Alliance tailored deterrence, to address DPRK’s threats including nuclear, WMD, and missiles, amidst a dynamic regional security environment. U.S. officials reaffirmed the ironclad U.S. commitment to provide extended deterrence to the ROK, utilizing the full range of U.S. capabilities, to include nuclear and conventional capabilities. ROK officials reaffirmed that they will continue to develop the ROK military’s nuclear and WMD response systems in order to deter and respond to North Korean threats. As part of the DSC, officials also participated in a tabletop exercise (TTX) to review measures to deter and respond to DPRK’s threats including nuclear, WMD, and missiles. The TTX outcomes will contribute to enhancing the combined deterrence capabilities of the Alliance and to shaping the Alliance Tailored Deterrence Strategy. On the margins of the DSC, A/ASD Dalton led consultations on the in-development U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and Missile Defense Review (MDR) in which the ROK provided constructive feedback to shape its outcome.
In conclusion, U.S. and ROK leaders assessed that the 20th KIDD reaffirmed the close bonds within the Alliance, bolstered Alliance coordination, and strengthened U.S.-ROK combined defense posture. Based on these outcomes, the two sides pledged to continue efforts to achieve meaningful progress at the 53rd SCM, to be hosted in Seoul, Republic of Korea in late 2021.
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